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REFORMING THE “BUSINESS” OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 
IN PENNSYLVANIA 
Patrick J. Gallo, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Charter schools are “a good idea, a timely experiment—but 
one that unfortunately has run amok in Pennsylvania.”1 
The concept of a charter school is derived from capitalistic 
ideals that school choice and competition will force the 
traditional American public school system to become more 
efficient and reform itself.2 The Pennsylvania General 
Assembly was persuaded by this vision when it enacted its 
“Charter School Law” in 1997.3 The Charter School Law was 
viewed as the lodestar for educational reform, furthering 
Pennsylvania’s Constitutional mandate, which requires “[t]he 
General Assembly . . . [to] provide for the maintenance and 
support of a thorough and efficient system of public education 
to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.”4 
At some point, however, entrepreneurs motivated by profit 
hijacked the charter school movement. The Charter School Law 
itself has been equated to the California Gold Rush of 1849 (the 
mine being the charter school and the gold being tax dollars).5 
 
* Patrick J. Gallo, Jr., Esq., is an associate attorney at MacElree Harvey, Ltd. He re-
ceived his J.D. from Widener University School of Law and his B.A. from West Chester 
University. This article is dedicated to his wife, Meredith, for her unrelenting love, 
support, and faith.   
 1  Chris Satullo, It’s a Shame Pa. Chose to Become a Wild West of Charter 
Schools, CENTRE SQUARE BLOG (Jan. 27, 2013), 
http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/local//education/50160-its-a-shame-pa-chose-to-
become-wild-west-of-charter-schools.  
 2  See Dylan P. Grady, Charter School Revocation: A Method for Efficiency, Ac-
countability, and Success, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 513, 521 (2012). 
 3  24 P.S. § 17-1701-A (1997), et seq. (amended 2002).. See 24 P.S. § 17-1741-A, 
et seq. 
 4  PA. CONST. art. III & XIV. 
 5  Karen Heller, In Philly, the Fast Track to the Cyber-School Bottom, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 25, 2013, available at http://articles.philly.com/2013-04-
25/news/38793237_1_cyber-charters-schools-city-students; see also Satullo, supra note 
1 (equating charter school proliferation to the Wild West).   
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There are now more than 1756 charter schools in 
Pennsylvania with over 105,0007 students and approximately 
44,000 more students on waiting lists.8 In addition, roughly 25 
percent of the student population in the Philadelphia School 
District attend public charter schools.9 Moreover, government 
financed charter schools present a significant opportunity for 
profiteers looking to cash in on this modern day “gold rush,”10 
and, with very little oversight, Pennsylvania public charter 
schools have become fraught with “chicanery and greed . . . [,] 
excessive executive salaries . . . [,] nepotism, and [dubious] 
financial and real-estate transactions.”11 
Part II of this article focuses on the charter school 
movement in Pennsylvania, and Part III discusses the creation 
and funding of charter schools under the Charter School Law. 
Part IV of this article explores the loopholes in the Charter 
School Law that allow entrepreneurs to squeeze profits and 
draw off tax dollars,12 as well as the consequences of minimal 
charter school oversight. Finally, Part V provides an overview 
of the charter school “product” and Part VI examines the need 
to reform the “business” of charter schools and recent 
legislative efforts to do so. 
II. THE CHARTER SCHOOL MOVEMENT 
Emerging in the 1970s,13 the concept of a charter school14 is 
 
 6  Eleanor Chute, Charter Schools Now Big Business Nationwide: Management 
Firms Bring Money, Clout to Help Operate Them, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 30, 
2012, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/news/education/2012/12/30/Charter-
schools-now-big-business-nationwide/stories/201212300213. 
 7  What’s a Charter School?, PENNSYLVANIA COALITION OF PUBLIC CHARTER 
SCHOOLS, http://pacharters.org/why-charters/ (noting that the number of Pennsylvania 
charter school students is approximately six percent (6%) of Pennsylvania’s entire stu-
dent population). 
 8  Id. 
 9  Id.  
 10  See Heller, supra note 5.  
 11  Holly Otterbein, Who’s Responsible for the Charter School Oversight Fiasco?, 
IT’S OUR MONEY BLOG (Apr. 15, 2010), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/ourmoney/Whos_responsible_for_the_charter_school
_oversight_fiasco.html. 
 12  See Stuart Knade, Fix Pennsylvania’s Charter School Law Now, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 2013, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/opinion/perspectives/fix-pennsylvanias-charter-school-law-now-
682032/.  
 13  Clarisse C. Casanova, Charter Schools: A Step in the Right Direction or a 
Fourth Left Turn For Public Education?, 7 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 231, 231 
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based on the free market theories of Milton Friedman and the 
idea that school choice would foster competition.15 In turn, such 
competition would ostensibly breed schools that were “more 
innovative, responsive, and efficient schools than government-
run education ‘monopolies.’”16 
Charter schools were initially regarded as a trailblazing 
alternative17 and the answer to “a perceived need for diversity 
and innovation in [traditional] public schools.”18 The charter 
school movement gained additional support from those who 
desired relief from the factory-style19 educational environment 
in favor of a more individualized educational experience via 
“school choice.”20 Teachers and administrators who wanted 
more autonomy and control over pedagogy and curriculum 
development were advocates for the charter school movement 
as well.21 The free market approach to education also spurred 
the “open-enrollment plan, inter-district transfer programs, 
private school tuition vouchers, . . . and magnet schools.”22 
The charter school movement, however, received some of its 
greatest support from the legislature.23 Charter schools were 
viewed as cutting edge and a significant catalyst for redefining 
 
(2008). 
 14  Id. at 234 (“Charter schools are publicly funded elementary or secondary 
schools that are accountable for producing specific results set forth in each school’s 
charter. These charters are essentially performance contracts that usually include pro-
visions describing the school’s detailed instructional plan, the specific educational re-
sults to be achieved, and the precise ways in which such results will be measured, 
managed, and financed.”); see also 24 P.S. § 17-1703-A (“‘Charter school’ shall mean an 
independent public school established and operated under a charter from the local 
board of school directors and in which students are enrolled or attend. A charter school 
must be organized as a public, nonprofit Corporation. Charters may not be granted to 
any for-profit entity.”). 
 15  Grady, supra note 2, at 520. 
 16  Grady, supra note 2, at 520–21 (citation omitted); the “charter school mar-
ket,” however, has been marked by inefficiencies “due to the presence of externalities 
and . . . high consumption of resources with inconsistent levels of output.” Id. at 538.   
 17  Casanova, supra note 13, at 231. 
 18  Kathryn Kraft, Cyber Charter Schools—An Analysis of their Legality, 56 
SMU L. REV. 2327, 2329 (2003). 
 19  “Id. (“In a factory model education system, experts design the overall system 
and make decisions in a centralized method.”)   
 20  Id.  
 21  See Id.; see also Robert A. Garda, Jr., Culture Clash: Special Education in 
Charter Schools, 90 N.C. L. REV. 655, 688 (2012) (“The foundation of the charter 
movement is autonomy and independence: freedom from rules and regulations that 
govern traditional schools.”).   
 22  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2329–30.  
 23  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2330.  
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the traditional landscape of the American public school 
system.24 Such an optimistic outlook offered bipartisan appeal 
and “[c]harter schools bask[ed] in the warm glow of positive 
rhetoric and political support.”25 Particularly in the 1990s, 
Americans pushed for educational reform over growing concern 
for the public school system.26 In 1997, Pennsylvania responded 
by enacting its own Charter School Law.27 
In theory, the view of charter schools was plainly idealistic 
without any objective basis: “Independently operated public 
schools, freed from many of the regulations and mandates 
constraining traditional public school systems [which 
seemingly] would be laboratories for educational innovation, 
producing new strategies and methods that could benefit 
students in all schools.”28 Legislators also considered charter 
schools a means of increasing learning opportunities for 
students, as well as professional opportunities for teachers.29 It 
was intended as a mechanism for more accountability in 
student achievement.30 
An intersection of the charter school movement and the 
Internet resulted in “the most recent evolution of the charter 
school movement”31—cyber charter schools.32 Cyber charter 
 
 24  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2330–31.  
 25  Susan L. DeJarnatt, Follow the Money: Charter Schools and Financial Ac-
countability, 44 URB. LAW. 37 (2012).  
 26  Kathryn M. Kraft, The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania Holds that 
Cyber Charter Schools are Legal According to the Existing Charter School Law—
Pennsylvania School Boards Ass’n, Inc. v. Zogby, 56 SMU L. REV. 1039 (2003).  
 27  24 P.S. § 17-1701-A, et seq.; see also 24 P.S. § 17-1702-A(1)-(6) (charter 
schools are meant to “[i]mprove pupil learning,” “[i]ncrease learning opportunities for 
all pupils,” “[e]ncourage the use of different and innovative teaching methods,” “[c]reate 
new professional opportunities for teachers,” “[p]rovide parents and pupils with ex-
panded choices in the types of educational opportunities that are available within the 
public school system,” and “[h]old the schools established under this act accountable for 
meeting measurable academic standards and provide the school with a method to es-
tablish accountability systems”); Pa. Charter School Law Ranked 13th Nationally, 
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, Apr. 4, 2012, available at 
http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/education/s_789730.html#axzz2RhQdyuqM 
(stating that “Pennsylvania’s charter school law earned a ranking of 13th nationally 
and a ‘‘B’’ grade in [an] annual report from the Center for Education Reform”); Kraft, 
supra note 26, at 1040. 
 28  Stuart L. Knade, Pennsylvania’s Charter School Law is Long Overdue for Re-
form: As I See It, PATRIOT NEWS, Apr. 11, 2013, available at 
http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/04/pennsylvanias_charter_school_law_
is_long_overdue_for_reform_as_i_see_it.html.  
 29  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2330.  
 30  Id. 
 31  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2341.   
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schools have never basked in the “warm glow”33 of positive 
rhetoric and political support, but rather were met with heavy 
opposition and criticism from school districts and public school 
educators.34 A further impediment has been that 
Pennsylvania’s Charter School Law initially failed to 
contemplate the existence of cyber charter schools,35 leaving 
cyber charter schools vulnerable to challenges of illegality.36 
One such challenge was the case of Pennsylvania School 
Boards Association Inc. v. Zogby.37 In Zogby the court held, 
among other things, that school districts have no standing to 
challenge the legality of cyber charter schools.38 The court in 
Zogby further noted in dicta that “[e]ven if [there was] standing 
to challenge the legality of cyber charter schools in this or 
another proceeding, we would conclude that the Charter School 
Law does not prohibit cyber schools.”39 Soon after Zogby, the 
Pennsylvania legislature quickly responded by amending the 
Charter School Law in July of 2002 to include statutory 
provisions pertaining to cyber charter schools.40 
Recently, No Child Left Behind41 and Race to the Top,42 
 
 32  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2341. (“A cyber charter school is a charter school that 
operated almost exclusively over the Internet, providing all or most of its instruction 
over the Internet to students who log on from their homes using computers purchased 
with public funds.”); see also 24 P.S. § 17-1703-A (“‘Cyber charter school’ shall mean an 
independent public school establishment operated under a charter from the Depart-
ment of Education and in which the school uses technology in order to provide a specif-
ic portion of its curriculum and to deliver significant portion of instruction to its stu-
dents through the Internet or other electronic means. A cyber charter school must be 
organized as a public, nonprofit Corporation. A charter may not be granted to a for-
profit entity”). Proponents of cyber charter schools maintain that such schools allow 
access to students under-served by brick and mortar schools, are flexible, modifiable, 
and adaptable to student needs. Kraft, supra note 18, at 2342.  
 33  See DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 37. 
 34  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2343 (critics of cyber charter schools argued that the 
State could not adequately monitor cyber schools, the schools themselves could not 
provide an adequate education, and that the schools lacked statutory authorization); 
see also Kraft, supra note 26, at 1039 (critics of cyber charter schools also cited attend-
ance verification issues and windfalls in funding because of relatively low operational 
costs). 
 35  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2342. 
 36  See Pennsylvania Sch. Bds. Ass’n., Inc. v. Zogby, 802 A.2d 6 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2002).  
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. at 10.  
 39  Id. at 11.  
 40  24 P.S. § 17-1741-A, et. seq. 
 41  20 U.S.C. 70 § 6301, et seq. (2002). 
 42  Sections 14005 and 14006 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 (ARRA), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.  
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federal programs that focus on school choice and 
accountability, “have created an environment for the expansion 
of charter schools.”43 Although questions have surfaced about 
the viability and effectiveness of charter schools, the 
proliferation of charter schools throughout the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania does not appear to be slowing down, despite 
cries for reform. 
To date, much of the case law concerning the Charter 
School Law turns on procedural technicalities.44 Some have 
argued that “the charter concept was seized . . . by those who 
hated public schools simply because they were government-run 
and . . . unionized.”45  In addition, it has been further argued 
that the charter school concept “was less about helping kids 
stuck in bad schools than it was about furthering an anti-
government agenda. It was about . . . ‘ending the state-run 
monopoly on education.’”46 Critics have maintained that 
charter schools and the Charter School Law present a 
significant opportunity for profiteers to capitalize on 
government financing.47 
One thing is certainly clear, charter schools no longer bask 
in the warm glow of positive rhetoric or bipartisan political 
support that they enjoyed when the Charter School Law was 
enacted.48 Nonetheless, charter schools have significant 
autonomy and independence with respect to operations49 and 
virtually any person or entity can establish a charter school.50 
III. HANGING OUT A CHARTER SCHOOL SHINGLE 
To set up shop and compete for tax dollars in the 
metaphorical “gold rush”51 that is charter schools, charter 
 
 43  Grady, supra note 2, at 519–20.  
 44  Robert J. Martin, Chartering the Court Challenges to Charter Schools, 109 
PENN ST. L. REV. 43, 75 (2004). 
 45  Satullo, supra note 1. 
 46  Satullo, supra note 1. 
 47  See Stephanie Saul, Profits and Questions at Online Charter Schools, NY 
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/education/online-schools-score-better-on-wall-
street-than-in-classrooms.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 48  See DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 37. 
 49  See generally, 24 P.S. § 17-1701-A, et seq.  
 50  24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(a). 
 51  Heller, supra note 5.  
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school applicants must be approved by either the local school 
board, or if denied by the local school board where they are 
based, then by appeal to the Pennsylvania Charter School 
Appeal Board.52 
A charter school in Pennsylvania “may be established by 
any individual, teacher, parent, guardian, any nonsectarian 
college, university or museum located in Pennsylvania, any 
nonsectarian corporation not-for-profit, or any corporation, 
association, partnership or combination thereof.”53 An 
application54 to establish a charter school must be submitted to 
the local school board of the district where the charter school 
will be located prior to November 15th of the school year 
preceding the first operational school year of the proposed 
charter school.55 Within forty-five days of receiving an 
application for a charter school, the local school board is to 
conduct a public hearing on the provisions of the charter 
school’s application56 and within seventy-five days of the public 
hearing, the local school board must render a decision as to 
whether it will grant or deny the charter school’s application.57 
An application that is denied may be revised and resubmitted 
to the local school board or the denial may be appealed to the 
Pennsylvania Charter School Appeal Board pursuant to 
Section 17-1721-A of the Charter School Law.58 
With respect to cyber charter schools, since they are 
statewide, an application59 to establish a cyber charter school 
must be submitted to the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education, rather than the local school board, by October 1st of 
 
 52  See 24 P.S. § 17-1717-A; 24 P.S. § 17-1745-A. 
 53  24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(a); see also Kraft, supra note 18, at 2331.  
 54  Section 17-1719-A of the Charter School Law governs the charter school ap-
plications for “brick and mortar” charter schools. 
 55  24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(c); see also 24 P.S. § 17-1718-A (requiring a regional 
charter school to submit applications to each local school board involved, who must act 
jointly in approving or denying the regional charter school); 24 P.S. § 17-1745-A (con-
cerning the establishment of a cyber charter school); see also Kraft, supra note 18, at 
2331. 
 56  24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(d); see also Kraft, supra note 18, at 2331. 
 57  24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(e)(1); see also Kraft, supra note 18, at 2331. 
 58  24 P.S. § 17-1717-A(f); see also Kraft, supra note 18, at 2331; Knade, supra 
note 12 (“A rigorous application process intended to provide quality control at the front 
end was gutted by an appeals process that routinely overturned school board denials of 
weak charter applications that were too poorly thought out to be trusted with tax dol-
lars and the precious educational years of children.”).  
 59  Section 17-1747-A of the Charter School Law governs the charter school ap-
plications for “cyber” charter schools. 
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the school year preceding the school year in which proposed 
cyber charter school intends to commence operation.60 
Additionally, in what can only be described as a paradox, 
the Charter School Law requires charter schools to be 
organized as a non-profit organization under Pennsylvania 
law61 but permits charter schools to be managed by for-profit 
educational management companies, also known as EMOs.62 
Furthermore, charter schools have the power to “[a]cquire real 
property from public or private sources by purchase, lease, 
lease with an option to purchase or gift for use as a charter 
school facility,”63 “[r]eceive and disburse funds for charter 
school purposes,”64 “[i]ncur temporary debts in anticipation of 
the receipt of funds,”65 and “[s]olicit and accept any gifts or 
grants for charter school purposes.”66 
IV. THE BUSINESS OF CHARTER SCHOOLS 
There are over 105,000 charter school students in 
Pennsylvania,67 32,000 of which are cyber students,68 and an 
estimated 44,000 more students are currently on charter school 
waiting lists.69 In total, Pennsylvania has approximately 175 
charter schools, including sixteen cyber charter schools.70 The 
City of Philadelphia alone is home to an estimated eighty 
charter schools with approximately 46,000 students.71 
 
 60  24 P.S. § 17-1745-A. 
 61  24 P.S. §§ 17-1717-A, 17-1718-A, and 17-1745-A; see also Collegium Charter 
School, 812 A.2d 1172. 
 62  Anne E. Trotter, Suzanne E. Eckes, and Jonathan A. Plucker, Education 
Management Organizations and Charter Schools: Serving all Students, 213 ED. LAW 
REP. 935, 937 (2006). 
 63  24 P.S. § 17-1714-A(3).  
 64  24 P.S. § 17-1714-A(4). 
 65  24 P.S. § 17-1714-A(6). 
 66  24 P.S. §1 7-1714-A(7). 
 67  What’s a Charter School, supra note 7.  
 68  Diane Ratvich, This is Unbelievable, DIANE RATVICH’S BLOG, July 10, 2012, 
available at http://dianeravitch.net/2012/07/10/this-is-unbelievable/; Jason Tomassini, 
After Closing Virtual Charter School, Pa. Authorizes Four More, EDUCATION WEEK, Ju-
ly 10, 2012, available at 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/marketplacek12/2012/07/after_closing_virtual_charter_
school_penn_authorizes_four_more.html.  
 69  What’s a Charter School?, supra note 7.  
 70  Chute, supra note 6.  
 71  Martha Woodall, 4 More Cyber Charters Set to Open as Lawmakers Debate 
Charter Funding, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jun. 29, 2012, available at 
http://articles.philly.com/2012-06-29/news/32457930_1_cyber-charters-charter-schools-
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Simply put, charter schools in Pennsylvania are big 
business and there are no signs of the business slowing down.72 
It is estimated that over the last decade $4 billion dollars have 
gone to charter schools in Pennsylvania.73 In the 2007–2008 
school year alone, Pennsylvania school districts paid out 
$627,984,205 in “tuition” payments to charter schools74 and in 
the 2010–2011 fiscal year, $1.129 billion, $322.3 million of 
which went to cyber charter schools.75 
The taxpayer-funded entrepreneurial exploits of some 
public charters schools have been plagued with profiteering, 
fraud, and chicanery.76 Specifically, the loopholes within 
Pennsylvania’s flawed charter school funding formula and lack 
of fiscal oversight have presented an opportunity for 
profiteers.77 Charter school profiteers have become proverbial 
parasites siphoning public funds meant for the education of 
Pennsylvania’s youth,78 morphing the charter school movement 
into the “financialization of public education.”79 
A. The Revenue Stream 
Like any business, the first and foremost concern for 
 
funding-formula. 
 72  See Pennsylvania School Boards Ass’n, Pennsylvania Charter Schools: Char-
ter/Cyber Charter Costs for Pennsylvania School Districts, Education Research & Poli-
cy Ctr., Oct. 2010, p. 18 (“The number of students attending charter schools is continu-
ing to increase. Between 2003–04 and 2008–09, the number of students increased at an 
annual average of 13.5%.”); see also Daniel Denvir, Corbett’s Aggressive Charter School 
Push Could Cost Taxpayers Money—and Oversight, Philadelphia City Paper, Sept. 6, 
2012, available at http://www.citypaper.net/news/2012-09-06-news-chartering-a-course-
governor-corbett.html?c=r.  
 73  Lawrence A. Feinberg, $4 Billion Taxpayer Dollars with no Real Oversight, 
Charter Schools—Public Funding without Public Scrutiny, May 21, 2012, available at 
http://keystonestateeducationcoalition.blogspot.com/2012/05/pa-charter-schools-4-
billion-taxpayer.html; see also Knade, supra note 12 (“Over the years, billions of tax 
dollars have been redirected away from local school systems under a funding scheme 
fundamentally flawed at the outset, one that calculates payouts without regards to the 
actual cost of operating charter schools, permits far too many of those diverted dollars 
to be siphoned away from charter school classrooms by for-profit educational manage-
ment companies and creates a zero-sum situation putting school districts and charter 
schools at odds instead of promoting collaborative partnerships.”). 
 74  Pennsylvania School Boards Ass’n, supra note 72, at 9. 
 75  Denvir, supra note 72.  
 76  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 39; see also Otterbein, supra note 11.  
 77  See Knade, supra note 12. 
 78  Id.  
 79  See Saul, supra note 47, (quoting Alex Molnar, a research professor at the 
University of Colorado Boulder School of Education) (“These folks are fundamentally 
trying to do to public education what the banks did with home mortgages.”).  
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charter schools is startup costs. Charter schools, however, can 
receive grants for planning and startup funding.80 “Once a 
charter school is created and initially funded, it opens” for 
business.81 
As a “private entit[y] funded by public money,”82 the 
revenue streams for charter schools are based in law, 
specifically in the Charter School Law. Funding for charter 
schools in Pennsylvania, whether brick and mortar or cyber, is 
governed by Section 17-1725-A of the Charter School Law.83 
Section 17-1725-A states the following, in pertinent part, with 
respect to charter school funding in Pennsylvania: 
(a) Funding for a charter school shall be provided in the 
following manner: 
(1) There shall be no tuition charge for a resident or 
nonresident student attending a charter school. 
(2) For non-special education students, the charter school 
shall receive for each student enrolled no less than the 
budgeted total expenditure per average daily membership 
of the prior school year, as defined in section 2501(20), 
minus the budgeted expenditures of the district of 
residence for nonpublic school programs; adult education 
programs; community/junior college programs; student 
transportation services; for special education programs; 
facilities acquisition, construction and improvement 
services; and other financing uses, including debt service 
and fund transfers as provided in the Manual of 
Accounting and Related Financial Procedures for 
Pennsylvania School Systems established by the 
department. This amount shall be paid by the district of 
residence of each student. 
(3) For special education students, the charter school shall 
receive for each student enrolled the same funding as for 
each non-special education student as provided in clause 
(2), plus an additional amount determined by dividing the 
district of residence’s total special education expenditure 
by the product of multiplying the combined percentage of 
section 2509.5(k) times the district of residence’s total 
average daily membership for the prior school year. This 
 
 80  24 P.S. §17-1731-A. 
 81  Kraft, supra note 18, at 2332.  
 82  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 39.  
 83  24 P.S. §17-1725-A. 
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amount shall be paid by the district of residence of each 
student. 
The foregoing per pupil funding scheme, however, is 
susceptible to and has been manipulated by profiteers. Under 
this scheme, the business model is simple—“[k]ids equal 
money.”84 This is precisely why many charter schools in 
Pennsylvania are located in urban areas such as 
Philadelphia,85 where charter schools have access to more 
resources (i.e. students) and where parents are willing to send 
their children to charter schools as a result of under-
performing local schools. 
When analyzing the Charter School Law, two glaring flaws 
in funding are evident. First, a charter school is receiving 
tuition payments for a local school district’s costs rather than 
the charter schools actual costs.86 This is especially troubling 
considering that cyber charter schools actual costs are much 
lower than brick and mortar school costs.87 
In a special report issued by Pennsylvania’s Auditor 
General, it was determined that Pennsylvania’s brick and 
mortar charter schools spent nearly all of the tuition payments 
they received, an average of $13,411 per student, while its 
cyber counterpart spent on average $10,145 per student.88 The 
 
 84  Saul, supra note 47; see also 24 P.S. § 17-1723A(d)(1) (there is no enrollment 
cap for charter schools in Pennsylvania). 
 85  Woodall, supra note 71 (the City of Philadelphia is home to around 80 total 
charter schools that are responsible for 46,000 students); see also Valerie Strauss, 
Pennsylvania School District on Verge of Collapse (and using Free Labor to Stay 




 86  Pennsylvania School Boards Ass’n, supra note 72, at 5. 
 87  Kevin P. Brady, Regina R. Umpstead, Suzanne Eckes, Uncharted Territory: 
The Current Legal Landscape of Public Cyber Charter Schools, 2010 B.Y.U. EDUC. & 
L.J. 191, 202 (2010) (noting that cyber charter schools do not have the same operational 
costs as “brick and mortar” schools, but do have start-up costs not associated with 
“brick and Mortar” schools. Specifically, cyber charter schools employ less instructional 
staff, employ less administrators, transportation, extensive physical plant, food service, 
and extra-curricular activities, but do have start-up costs including the cost of comput-
ers, scanners, and printers for each student and teacher, as well as content-
management systems); cf Jack Wagner, Pennsylvania Department of the Auditor Gen-
eral, Bureau of School Audits, Special Report, July 20, 2012, available at 
http://www.auditorgen.state.pa.us/Department/Press/CyberCharterSpecialReport20120
6.pdf.; cyber charter schools also receive varying tuition payments because such pay-
ments are drawn statewide rather than from one particular district. See Pennsylvania 
School Boards Ass’n, supra note 72, at 1. 
 88  Wagner, supra note 87, at 2.  
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national average for per pupil costs for brick and mortar and 
cyber charter schools was approximately $10,000 and $6,500 
respectively.89 Assuming such rates reflected actual costs, cyber 
charter schools stand to profit around $3,500 for each regular 
education student it enrolls. 
Many charter schools act simply as “a source of 
government-financed business, much as military contractors 
have capitalized on Pentagon spending.”90 The Charter School 
Law funding formula encourages increased enrollment because 
each student equals profit, which is why many charter schools 
have launched aggressive advertising and recruiting 
campaigns as discussed infra, employed for the sheer purpose 
of raising enrollment.91 Charter schools also “fail to filter out 
students who are not suited for the program,”92 as it would 
result in a loss of funding. Profits can further be squeezed if 
charter schools minimize costs by lowering standards and 
increasing the teacher-student ratio93 and teacher workload.94 
The Wagner Report revealed a disparity between 
Pennsylvania and other states in annual per pupil charter 
school spending.95 Collectively, Pennsylvania charter schools 
spent approximately $12,657 per student, whereas Ohio 
charter schools averaged $10,652 per pupil, Michigan averaged 
$9,480 per pupil, Texas averaged $8,954 per pupil, and Arizona 
averaged $7,671 per pupil,96 which suggests that Pennsylvania 
charter schools are inefficient. 
The second glaring flaw in the funding scheme is the 
 
 89  Wagner, supra note 87, at 3–4.  
 90  Saul, supra note 47; see also Martha Woodall, Report Cites Questionable 
Charter School Practices, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jun. 24, 2011, available at 
http://www.philly.com/philly/education/20100405_Report_cites_questionable_charter-
school_practices.html (Alan Butkovitz, Controller for the City of Philadelphia, stated 
that “[c]harter [s]chools are an experiment in using private business models in the edu-
cational field, but this is not private money. . . . [c]harter schools are spending tax dol-
lars as if it’s nobody’s business—as if they were private fiefdoms.”). 
 91  See Saul, supra note 47.  
 92  Saul, supra note 47. 
 93  Saul, supra note 47 (noting that some high school teachers in the Agora 
Cyber Charter School were managing more than 250 students). 
 94  Saul, supra note 47. Without a union, charter schoolteachers are powerless, 
especially with the over-saturated educator market. As a result, the Agora Cyber Char-
ter School is in a bitter unionization battle in which unfair labor practices have been 
filed against the school. See also PENNSYLVANIA STATE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, avail-
able at http://www.agoraea.psealocals.org/  
 95  Wagner, supra note 87, at 2.  
 96  Wagner, supra note 87, at 2. 
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disparate treatment of special education students.97 A greater 
windfall, and larger profit margins, can be obtained via special 
education students. “For special education students, payments 
are based on the prior year average daily membership 
multiplied by 16 percent (total estimated statewide special 
education enrollment in each local school district). The result is 
then divided into the special education program spending . . . to 
get an average cost per student.”98 Thus, it can be more 
profitable for a charter school to have a student with relatively 
mild special education needs as opposed to a student with 
greater special education needs. Conversely, a student with 
greater special education needs could result in a deficit for 
charter schools, as students with more needs are more 
expensive to educate.99 As a result, “charter schools struggle to 
enroll and appropriately serve students with disabilities such 
as mental retardation; serious emotional disturbance; autism; 
specific learning disabilities; and hearing, speech, language, or 
orthopedic or visual impairments.”100 
Pennsylvania’s charter school funding scheme provides 
greater incentives for charter schools to “counsel out101 students 
with disabilities or cherry-pick students with mild 
disabilities,”102 in direct violation of their civil rights.103 For 
instance, in the Chester-Upland School District, 40 percent of 
the special needs students in the Chester Community Charter 
 
 97  24 P.S. §17-1725-A(a)(3).  
 98  Pennsylvania School Boards Ass’n, supra note 72, at 5; see also 24 P.S. §17-
1725-A(a)(3). 
 99  Garda, supra note 21, at 688 (in addition to costs, charter schools are moti-
vated to avoid enrolling disabled students for purposes of accountability). 
 100  Garda, supra note 21, at 659. 
 101  Counseling out is the practice of informing parents that the charter school 
cannot meet their child’s needs and that their child should attend another school in-
stead. Casanova, supra note 13, at 243. 
 102  Garda, supra note 21, at 688; see also Casanova, supra note 13, at 232 (“This 
is especially disconcerting considering the fact that these children, with their special 
individualized needs, are arguably the ones who could benefit from unique programs 
and innovative practices the most”).  
 103  Garda, supra note 21, at 659; see also 24 P.S. § 17-1723-A(2) (“A charter 
school may limit admission to a particular grade level, a targeted population group 
composed of at-risk students, or areas of concentration of the school such as mathemat-
ics, science or the arts. A charter school may establish reasonable criteria to evaluate 
prospective students which shall be outlined in the school’s charter”); Cent. Dauphin 
Sch. Dist. v. Founding Coal.,of the Infinity Charter Sch., 847 A.2d 195 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2004); Casanova, supra note 13, at 238 (providing that as a public school, charter 
schools must adhere to the Individuals with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, and Title II of the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act). 
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School were classified as speech or language-impaired, a 
significant percentage of special needs students in regards to a 
disability considered mild in terms of both costs and 
remediation.104 Whereas, only 6.3 percent of the Chester 
Upland School District’s special education students were 
classified as speech or language-impaired students, leaving 
Chester-Upland to educate a grossly disproportionate number 
of special education students that are more costly and difficult 
to educate.105 Additionally, the special education formula also 
fails to compensate for those school districts whose special 
education enrollment is greater than 16 percent of its entire 
student population.106 
“The true threat of charter schools to traditional public 
education is not their creaming effect—luring the best and 
brightest students away from public schools—but their 
sedimentary effect, leaving the most difficult and most 
expensive disabled students behind in public schools.”107 The 
charter school funding scheme and emphasis on performance 
tests creates an environment that deters the establishment of 
progressive charter schools specializing in the education of 
students with significant needs. 
B. The Pinch 
Local school districts have particularly and inequitably felt 
the sting of the charter school funding formula.108 Charter 
schools are funded by redirecting funds from local school 
districts to make tuition payments to charter schools on a per 
 
 104  Dan Hardy, Chester Upland: State Special Ed Formula Drains Millions from 
District, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 6, 2012, available at 
http://articles.philly.com/2012-02-06/news/31030424_1_charter-schools-special-
education-cost-special-education.   
 105  Id.   
 106  Id. (“The special-education cost used to calculate Chester Upland’s payments 
to charters this year was $17.3 million. The district could only count 16 percent of its 
students—1,182—in figuring its per-student special-education payments. That came 
out to $14,670 per student, added to the regular education per student cost of $9,858. If 
the actual number of Chester Upland’s special-education students—more than 1,650—
were used to figure the per-student cost, that figure would have been cut by more than 
$4,000 per student, and the district’s payments to charters would be millions less.”) Id. 
 107  Garda, supra note 21, at 718; see also David Lapp, Problem of Charters 
Schools is Lack of Access for Vulnerable Students, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 20, 
2012 (“‘school choice’ means parents and students choosing schools, not schools choos-
ing students”). 
 108  See Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, supra note 72, at 2. 
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pupil basis.109 Originally 25–30 percent of such tuition 
payments and charter school costs incurred by local school 
districts were subsidized by the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania (“Commonwealth”),110 but recent budget cuts 
have done away with such reimbursements, leaving local school 
districts with a significant unreimbursed burden.111 Moreover, 
the savings local school districts were supposed to see have not 
been realized because students have not been leaving in neat 
groups of thirty. Consequently, local school districts have not 
been able to cut costs as anticipated.112 
C. Additional Revenue Streams for Charter Schools 
The Charter School Law provides additional revenue 
streams beyond the fundamentally flawed funding structure. 
Among other provisions, Section 2574.3 of the Public School 
Code of 1949113 provides state reimbursement to charter schools 
for leases of buildings or portions of buildings utilized by the 
charter school. Furthermore, pursuant to the Public School 
Employees’ Retirement Code,114 the Commonwealth is required 
to reimburse “school entities” for contributions of one-half of 
the amount certified by the Public School Employees’ 
Retirement Board as necessary to provide to the Public School 
Employees’ Retirement Fund (“PSERF”).115 Thus, charter 
schools are reimbursed 50 percent of their pension costs from 
the Commonwealth.116 School districts, however, must include 
the pension payments they make in their calculations for 
charter school tuition payments, leaving charter schools with 
another windfall. In fact, charter schools stand to see increased 
 
 109  See 24 P.S. § 17-1725-A(a)(2)–(3).  
 110  24 P.S. § 25-2591.1; see also Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, supra note 72Error! Book-
mark not defined., at 1. 
 111  Steve Esack and John L. Micek, Corbett Takes Ax to Education Spending, 
THE MORNING CALL, Mar. 8, 2011, http://articles.mcall.com/2011-03-08/news/mc-
pennsylvania-corbett-education-bud20110308_1_education-funding-basic-education-
school-districts; Knade, supra note 12.  
 112  Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, supra note 72, at 2 (“374 districts paid for fewer than 60 
students to attend charter schools.”). In addition, students have been transferring to 
charter schools from all grade levels, at different times and from various districts. See 
id. 
 113  24 P.S. § 25-2574.3. 
 114  24 Pa.C.S.A, §§ 8101−8535. 
 115  24 Pa.C.S.A. § 8535(2); see also 24 Pa.C.S.A. § 8535(1) (requiring 100% reim-
bursement if a “member’s” effective date of employment is after June 30, 1994).  
 116  Id. 
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revenue from PSERF rate increases via the foregoing “double 
dip.”117 
Another issue concerns operating fund balances: “While the 
school code creates a cap of school districts’ operating fund 
balances of 8–12 percent, charter schools have no such cap.”118 
The total operating fund balance for charter schools for the 
2007–2008 school year was $110,386,040 and has increased 
$47 million since the 2004–2005 school year.119 Thus, charter 
schools are blatantly operating with significant surpluses, 
while school districts like the School District of Philadelphia 
are operating with what it deems a “catastrophic budget,”120 or 
a significant deficit in funding. 
D. Oversight Fiasco 
The autonomy and independence of Pennsylvania’s public 
charter schools has extended beyond pedagogy. The Charter 
School Law bestows oversight power on local school districts for 
brick and mortar charter schools121 and the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education for cyber charter schools.122 There is, 
however, no state funding for this oversight, making such a 
task especially difficult for the School District of Philadelphia, 
which has to oversee approximately eighty charter schools.123  
State funding for oversight would ensure that financially 
struggling schools would have the resources to actually provide 
adequate oversight, or alternatively, the Commonwealth could 
provide such oversight. 
In April of 2010, Philadelphia’s Office of the Controller 
issued a scathing report of the expenditures of Philadelphia’s 
charter schools revealing, among other things, excessive 
compensation packages, management agreements for 
percentages of charter school “profits,” and zero compliance 
 
 117  Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, supra note 72, at 17; see also Wagner, supra note 87. 
 118  Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, supra note 72, at 16 (stating approximately 80% of cyber 
schools have fund balances exceeding the cap placed on school districts). 
 119  Pa. Sch. Bds. Ass’n, supra note 72, at 16. 
 120  Kristen A. Graham, ‘Catastrophic’ Budget Laid Out by Philly Schools, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 20, 2013, http://articles.philly.com/2013-04-
20/news/38677018_1_budget-picture-summer-school-food-services.  
 121  24 P.S. § 17-1728-A. 
 122  24 P.S. § 17-1742-A. 
 123  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 45. The School District of Philadelphia Charter 
School Office had a staff of four to carry out the oversight function for Philadelphia-
based brick and mortar charter schools. Id. 
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with Pennsylvania’s Right to Know Law.124 There were also 
issues with charter schools attempting to qualify employees for 
a PSERF pension, when such employees would not otherwise 
be eligible for a PSERF pension.125 In addition, Form 990s126 
submitted by charter schools have raised many red flags.127 For 
example, Form 990 entries for “other” expenses that were 
neither identifiable nor defined totaled $912,274, $1,071,755, 
and $432,145 for some Philadelphia-based brick and mortar 
charter schools.128 
Lack of any real or adequate oversight has also resulted in 
excessive compensation packages for charter school leaders.129 
During the 2007–2008 school year, the ten highest paid brick 
and mortar Philadelphia-based charter school CEOs, a public 
school equivalent to a superintendent, averaged approximately 
$175,246 per year; whereas, the Assistant Superintendents for 
the entire School of District of Philadelphia averaged only 
$133,889.130 The CEO for the Multi-Cultural Academy Charter 
School, Vuong Thuy, received a base salary of $206,342.131 Even 
more troubling, the CEO for K12’s132 Pennsylvania-based cyber 
charter school, the Agora Cyber Charter School, was 
compensated $5 million in 2011 alone.133 
Charter schools also appear to have an inequitable and 
overabundance of administrators.134 Administrative 
expenditures for brick and mortar charter schools in 
 
 124  Officer of the Controller, FRAUD & SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS: REVIEW OF 
CHARTER SCHOOL OVERSIGHT, A FRAUD VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT i-ii (2010), avail-
able at http://www.philadelphiacontroller.org/publications/other%20reports/Chart 
erSchoolInvestigation_FullReport.pdf. 
 125  Id. at M4. 
 126  http://www.guidestar.org/rxg/help/faqs/form-990/index.aspx#faq1942 (“Form 
990 is an annual reporting return that certain federally tax-exempt organizations must 
file with the IRS. It provides information on the filing organization’s mission, pro-
grams, and finances”). 
 127  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 64−65. 
 128  Id. 
 129  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 66. 
 130  Id. 
 131  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 67. 
 132  See Saul, supra note 47 (K12 is a publicly traded for-profit education man-
agement company that runs Agora Cyber Charter School, a Pennsylvania public cyber 
charter school, which accounts for approximately ten percent (10%) of K12’s revenue 
for the 2010−2011 school year). 
 133  Id.; see also Feinberg, supra note 73 (noting that Pennsylvania’s Budget Sec-
retary, Charles Zogby, was a former K12 executive).  
 134  See DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 70. 
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Philadelphia averaged $1,506 per pupil as compared to $792 
per pupil for the School District of Philadelphia.135 Additionally, 
“Charter school boards often include people who were involved 
in the founding of the school and who have a strong 
relationship with the CEO.”136 Thus, nepotism is not a foreign 
concept to charter schools and seems to be a component of the 
charter school hiring process.137 
In regards to funding, some Philadelphia-based charter 
schools were operating with significant surpluses of $1,035,467, 
$1,833,291, $1,427,451, and $1,879,670,138 while the School 
District of Philadelphia is facing a shortfall of $300 million for 
the 2013–2014 school year.139 Conversely, some Philadelphia-
based charter schools have been operating with deficits of 
$1,066,835, $1,543,043, and $219,291.140 
The leasing reimbursement scheme141 has also presented 
another opportunity for profiteers and entrepreneurs that have 
set up entities associated with the charter school in order to 
privately capitalize on the state reimbursements to charter 
schools for leasing properties.142 The monthly lease payment for 
brick and mortar charter schools is, in many cases, excessive.143 
For example, one-third of the Multi-Cultural Academy Charter 
School’s revenue in 2011, $516,000, went to pay the charter 
school’s building lease.144 Similarly, Preparatory Charter 
School for Math, Science, Technology, and Careers purchased a 
property in 2003 for $875,000 and expended $2,637,968 in 
building costs that same year.145 The property was then 
transferred for $1 to an associated entity in which three of the 
 
 135  See DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 70. 
 136  See DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 46. 
 137  See DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 70. For instance, the Community Academy 
Charter School, which was founded by Joseph Proietta, has six employees with the 
surname of Proietta.  
 138  See DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 72. 
 139  Graham, supra note 120; see also Woodall, supra note 71 (The School District 
of Philadelphia spent $356.7 million of its $2.3 billion budget on charters schools in the 
2010–2011 school year.); see also Strauss, supra note 85 (highlighting the potential fi-
nancial collapse of the Chester-Upland School District in Chester, Pennsylvania, where 
forty-five percent (45%) of the students are served by public charter schools). 
 140  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 71.  
 141  24 P.S. § 25-2574.3. 
 142  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 72.  
 143  See id.  
 144  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 73. 
 145  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 74. 
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charter school’s board members were connected.146 The 
associated entity in that case received $1,080,000 in lease 
payments from the charter school, which in turn was 
reimbursed by the state.147 
Charter Schools are also vulnerable to fraud. Dorothy June 
Brown, founder of the Agora Cyber Charter School, was 
charged with defrauding three charter schools of more than 
$6.5 million between 2007 and April of 2011, $5.6 million of 
which purportedly was paid under a fabricated management 
contract to her private educational management company.148 As 
of November 2012, nineteen Philadelphia charters schools were 
under investigation by federal authorities and there have been 
five convictions of charter school officials for, among other 
things, fraud and theft.149 Additionally, more than 20 percent of 
all charter schools are or have been under investigation for, 
among other things, misappropriation of funds.150 
Utilizing public funds, many charter schools also engage in 
aggressive advertising and lobbying campaigns.151 For example, 
K12 Inc., a publicly managed company that manages schools 
like Agora, spent $26.5 million on advertising in 2010 in an 
effort to recruit and enroll students through recruitment 
meetings in area hotels, as well as billboard, TV, and radio 
ads.152 K12’s recruitment call center has been characterized as 
a “high-pressured sales environment aimed at one thing: 
enrollment.”153 As of 2011, K12 had spent around $681,000 on 
lobbying in Pennsylvania since 2007.154 Pennsylvania Families 
for Public Cyber Schools, which receives money from charter 
schools, purportedly spent approximately $250,000 on lobbying 
 
 146  Id. 
 147  Id.  
 148  Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Charter School Founder Dorothy June 
Brown Charged in a $6 Million Fraud Scheme (Jun. 24, 2012) available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/philadelphia/press-releases/2012/charter-school-founder-dorothy-
june-brown-charged-in-6-million-fraud-scheme. (Dorothy June Brown is the founder of 
the Agora Cyber Charter School).  
 149  DeJarnatt, supra note 25, at 49–50 (2012). 
 150  Press Release, Representative James R. Roebuck, 44 Pa. cyber/charter 
schools with investigations or problems; Support grows for bill to return $365 million in 
overpayments (Mar. 19, 2013) available at http://www.pahouse.com/roebuck/PA 
HouseNews.asp?doc=29066.  
 151  Saul, supra note 47.   
 152  Id. 
 153  Id. 
 154  Id. 
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in the past five years.155 The founder of the for-profit 
management company that operates the Chester Community 
Charter School was the largest single contributor to 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Corbett’s campaign.156 
For-profit educational management companies are also 
prevalent in many of Pennsylvania’s charter schools. 
Pennsylvania’s Auditor General determined that 42 percent of 
cyber charter schools and 30 percent of brick and mortar 
charter schools paid for-profit educational management 
companies and that 100 percent of the top five of 
Pennsylvania’s largest charter schools utilized educational 
management organizations during the 2010–2011 school 
year.157 The Pennsylvania Cyber Charter School, for instance, 
is the largest cyber charter school in Pennsylvania and pays 
“tens of millions of dollars a year to a network of nonprofit and 
for-profit companies run by former executives.”158 All in all, 
according to Pennsylvania’s Auditor General, Pennsylvania 
taxpayers are being overcharged $365 million annually as a 
result of Pennsylvania’s charter school funding scheme.159  
Adequate oversight would likely help reduce this number 
significantly. 
V. THE PRODUCT 
“The deal struck between charter schools and their 
authorizers is simple: charter schools are freed from rules and 
 
 155  Saul, supra note 47. 
 156  Tracie Mauriello, Corbett’s Team Jingles with Donors, Two-thirds of Members 
Have Financial Ties to Campaign, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 2010, 
http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/corbetts-team-jingles-with-donors-
278351/#ixzz1KufEATau; see also Denvir, supra note 72 (“Three members of Corbett’s 
2010 education transition team, including Budget Secretary Charles Zogby, have man-
aged charters touched by accusations of excessive executive compensation, sketchy fi-
nancial practices or corruption.”). 
 157  Wagner, supra note 87, at 6.  
 158  Rich Lord & Eleanor Chute, Cyber Charter is a Magnet for Money: State’s 
Largest Online Public School Pays Millions to Companies Run by its Former Executives, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 17, 2012, http://articles.philly.com/2012-07-
17/news/32699011_1_cyber-charter-nick-trombetta-pa-cyber.   
 159  Wagner, supra note 87, at 1.; see also Steve Esack, Charter School Reform 
Heating up as Part of State Budget Debate: State Senators Quiz Education Secretary on 
Governor’s Appetite to Reform Charter School Law to Save Taxpayers Money, THE 
MORNING CALL, Mar. 5, 2013, available at http://articles.mcall.com/2013-03-
05/news/mc-pa-senate-education-budget-hearing-0304-20130304_1_charter-schools-
school-districts-education-secretary-ron-tomalis.  
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regulations, but only if they improve student academic 
outcomes . . . determined by a combination of student 
performance on standardized tests and graduation rates.”160 A 
recent report by Stanford University’s Center for Research on 
Education Outcomes, however, suggests that Pennsylvania 
charter schools have not been living up to their end of the 
bargain.161 
The learning gains for students in brick and mortar charter 
schools was significantly less on average than traditional 
public schools in math from 2007–2010, but was nearly the 
same for reading.162 Cyber charter schools, however, had 
significantly smaller gains in reading and math than those 
students in traditional public schools.163 “Overall, charter 
school performance in Philadelphia lagged in growth compared 
to traditional public schools.”164 A 2010 PEW Study revealed 
mixed results: 
On the [Pennsylvania System of School Assessment], charter 
students in Philadelphia performed better in math and 
reading in 2009 than their district counterparts. Fifty-six 
percent of charter students scored ‘advanced’ or ‘proficient’ in 
reading, compared to 48 percent of the district students and 
71 percent statewide. When it came to math, 57 percent of the 
charter students scored ‘advanced’ or ‘proficient,’ compared to 
52 percent of the district students and 73 percent 
statewide.165 
This outcome, however, should be weighted in light of the 
charter schools mix of students. Charter schools “serve fewer 
impoverished students, fewer English language learners, fewer 
students with severe disabilities, and fewer boys.”166 Despite 
this, the PEW study also found that 
 
 160  Garda, supra note 21, at 666. 
 161  See CHARTER SCHOOL PERFORMANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA, CENTER FOR 
RESEARCH ON EDUCATION OUTCOMES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (April 2011) available at 
http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/PA%20State%20Report_20110404_FINAL.pdf.  
 162  Id. at 8.  
 163  Id.  
 164  Id. at 20.  
 165  THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS’ PHILADELPHIA RESEARCH INITIATIVE, 




 166  See Lapp, supra note 107. 
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On the 2009 SAT . . . students in charter high schools 
performed worse than their counterparts in district-run 
schools. They scored an average of 779 out of 1,600 in the 
math and verbal portions of the test, taken by students 
applying to college, compared to an average of 814 in district-
run high schools.  Both are well below the national average of 
1,016.167 
With regard to recent academic benchmarks, the Corbett 
Administration originally altered the Pennsylvania System of 
School Assessment (“PSSA”) testing rules for charter schools 
without federal approval in order to make it easier for charter 
schools to satisfy federal benchmarks.168 Prior to a federally 
mandated recalculation, 54 percent of charter schools made 
“AYP,”169 or adequate yearly progress.170 After the federally 
mandated recalculation, only 28 percent of Pennsylvania 
charter schools made AYP in the 2011–2012 school year, none 
of which were cyber charter schools.171 Comparatively, 50 
percent of district-run schools made AYP for the 2011–2012 
school year.172 Charter schools also have a 2.3 percent dropout 
rate as compared to the district-run school dropout rate of 1.2 
percent.173 Lastly, concerns have also risen regarding the 
innovativeness of charter schools, especially cyber charter 
 
 167  THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS’ PHILADELPHIA RESEARCH INITIATIVE, supra 
note 165, at 20.  
 168  Steve Esack & Eugene Tauber, State Changed PSSA Testing Rules for Char-
ter Schools without Federal Approval: Rules Change Appears to Have Inflated Success 
Rate of Some Charter Schools, THE MORNING CALL, Oct. 5, 2012, 
http://articles.mcall.com/2012-10-05/news/mc-pa-charter-tomalis-ayp-
20121005_1_public-charter-schools-bob-fayfich-test-participation-rates (“Gov. Tom 
Corbett’s education chief changed the PSSA testing rules in a way that makes it easier 
for charter schools to meet federal benchmarks than traditional public schools. Educa-
tion Secretary Ron Tomalis’ change, made without federal approval, might have 
skewed the results of the 2011–12 PSSA scores to make it appear charter schools were 
outperforming traditional public schools, according to a Morning Call review of publicly 
available test score data.”).  
 169  AYP, or adequate yearly progress, is a part of the federal No Child Left Be-
hind Act and measures the annual progress of schools towards reaching the goal of 
100% proficiency in math and reading. Pennsylvania Department of Education, Aca-
demic Achievement Report http://paayp.emetric.net/Home/About (last visited Jan. 30, 
2014).  
 170  Martha Woodall, With New Rules, Pa. Charter School Performance Plum-
mets, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 25, 2013, 
http://www.philly.com/philly/education/188308291.html.  
 171  Id.  
 172  Id.  
 173  Esack, supra note 159.  
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schools.174 
VI. THE NEED TO REFORM THE BUSINESS OF CHARTER 
SCHOOLS 
Charter schools are “a good idea, a timely experiment—but 
one that unfortunately has run amok in Pennsylvania.”175 
Despite exemplary charter school examples, “[t]he data are [sic] 
clear. It’s all about the profits.”176 Profiteers have hijacked the 
charter school movement, siphoning public funds, pocketing 
efficiency costs, and squeezing profits in what has evolved into 
a metaphorical “educational gold rush.”177 The Charter School 
Law has also fostered a climate where charter schools are 
competing against local school districts for resources and 
students.178 The funding scheme and outcome determinative 
focus of the Charter School Law also encourages charter 
schools to cherry pick the best and cheapest students to 
educate, while weeding out those students that are more costly 
to educate and arguably the most vulnerable.179 In addition, 
some politicians are ostensibly utilizing the charter school 
movement and the rhetoric of “school choice” to further their 
political agendas of privatization and the dismantling of 
unions.180 Some of the most troubling aspects of the charter 
school movement are the numerous instances and anecdotes of 
fraud, nepotism, and chicanery as described supra.181 
Pennsylvania students are the losers in all of this. The 
 
 174  See e.g., Saul, supra note 47 (questioning the “cutting-edge” nature of cyber 
school, noting that critics have characterized cyber education as subsidized home 
schooling).   
 175  Satullo, supra note 1Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 176  Ratvich, supra note 68.  
 177  Heller, supra note 5.  
 178  Kristen A. Graham, Philadelphia Hopes to Launch Cyber School in Fall, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 18, 2013,  http://articles.philly.com/2013-04-
19/news/38650042_1_cyber-charters-cyber-students-virtual-school (Philadelphia school 
district is partnering with the Chester County Intermediate Unit to provide a virtual 
academy for its students).   
 179  Garda, supra note 21, at 718; see also Lapp, supra note 107 (“‘[S]chool choice’ 
means parents and students choosing schools, not schools choosing students.”). 
 180  See Denvir, supra note 72 (“Against this faint resistance to charters, Cor-
bett—with his ties to the pro-charter advocates and execs angling for a slice of the bil-
lion-dollar education pie—reinforced the view that he is stacking the deck against tra-
ditional public schools in June when a new law, requiring that test scores be included 
in teacher evaluations, excluded charters.”). 
 181  See generally, DeJarnatt, supra note 25; see also Otterbein, supra note 11.  
Gallo Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/27/14  10:04 PM 
230 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2014 
Charter School Law is flawed and in desperate need of reform. 
It should be amended to provide more oversight, transparency, 
accountability, and compliance with Pennsylvania’s Sunshine 
Act182 and Right to Know Law,183 whether through a funded 
charter school oversight office or a more efficient charter school 
revocation statute to ensure that charter schools that are 
actually improving education are funded, while by the same 
token promoting accountability.184 The inequitable funding 
scheme for charter schools urgently needs to be changed to 
reflect actual charter school costs,185 while removing the 
retirement funding double dipping and blind lease 
reimbursement arrangement.186 Operating fund balances 
should also be capped.187 Legislators should further consider 
curtailing or regulating for-profit educational management 
companies.188 Additionally, the original reimbursement to 
school districts for charter school costs should be reinstituted.  
The Charter School Law further needs to implement 
mechanisms to protect our most vulnerable students. For 
instance, the Charter School Law should be amended to require 
universal enrollment procedures,189 while penalizing charter 
schools that improperly exclude students.190 Moreover, greater 
weight should be accorded to academic progress, growth, and 
input, rather than output.191 The Charter School Law further 
needs to be revised to allow local schools districts to “share in 
the charter school experiment.”192 
The Pennsylvania General Assembly has recognized this 
need for reform and “the need to promote more sensible 
funding, quality in planning and governance, better fiscal and 
educational accountability, and more transparency in 
 
 182  65 Pa.C.S.A. § 701. 
 183  65 P.S. § 67.101. 
 184  See Grady, supra note 2, at 539. 
 185  Wagner, supra note 87, at 2.  
 186  Id. 
 187  Pa Sch. Bds. Ass’n, supra note 72, at 16. 
 188  See Kathleen Conn, When School Management Companies Fail, Righting Ed-
ucational Wrongs, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 245 (2002); see also Wagner, supra note 87, at 2. 
 189  Garda, supra note 21, at 710. 
 190  David Lapp, Charter School Reform Must Protect Vulnerable Students, THE 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 26, 2012. 
 191  See Joel Naroff, Are Charter Schools Working, It’s Anybody’s Guess, Philadel-
phia Inquirer, Apr. 8, 2013, http://articles.philly.com/2013-04-
08/business/38348740_1_traditional-public-school-cyber-schools-charter-school.  
 192  Knade, supra note 28.  
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operations.”193 The 2013–2014 legislative session has produced 
numerous pieces of legislation proffered to address the 
inequities and apparent flaws of the Charter School Law.194 
There is also legislation, however, which seeks to promote more 
charter schools without first instituting reform. Specifically, 
some legislators, with the support of the Corbett 
administration, appear to be “stacking the deck” against public 
schools in what is seemingly an attempt to cater to charter 
school executives to further political ideologies.195 Such 
legislation would authorize “the governor to declare a school 
district ‘financially distressed’ and appoint a chief recovery 
officer empowered to close schools, cancel union contracts and 
hand over school management to private entities.”196 Handing 
over the reins to the school districts to an experiment, however, 
seems highly illogical. 
VII.     CONCLUSION 
The charter school system has not proven to be the expected 
pinnacle to reform. Charter schools have the potential to fix 
certain aspects of Pennsylvania’s educational system, but only 
if the Charter School Law is reformed to close loopholes and 
curtail its vulnerability to harmful profiteering. 
In conclusion, education is not a business and should not be 
operated as such.  Many business principles run contrary to 
educational principles in which we want all children to 
maximize their achievement. The charter school movement is 
merely an experiment, and legislators need to ensure the 
Charter School Law provides the necessary laboratory 
conditions for charter schools to accurately be assessed, free 
from profiteering, fraud, corruption, and political ideologies, 
which have undoubtedly plagued the charter school initiative 
 
 193  See Knade, supra note 28.  
 194  See http://www.psba.org/issues-advocacy/issues-research/cyber-charter-
schools/2013bills/Charter_Reform_Bills-041113.pdf (noting the following Pennsylvania 
charter school reform bills: HB 979, HB 984, HB 759, HB 617, HB 618, HB 980, HB 
934, HB 970, HB 971, HB 371, HB 372, HB 1074, HB 1082, and SB 812).  
 195  See Denvir, supra note 72 (“But public-education activists say a larger agen-
da to undermine public schools in favor of charter operators—at a large cost to fiscally 
distraught districts—is evident.”). 
 196  Id.; see also Associated Press, Pennsylvania advances bill that paves way for 
state takeovers of struggling school districts, THE PATRIOT NEWS, May 22, 2012, 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2012/05/pennsylvania_advances_bill_tha.h
tml.  
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from the beginning. Students should not be viewed in dollars 
and cents. 
 
